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DiSK – A Deniable Split KEM from Lattices
Summary
As the pending migration away from quantum-vulnerable cryptography becomes a reality, widely used key-exchange protocols like Signal need to be urgently replaced. One tool for finding replacements are deniable split Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs). Split KEMs are designed to mimic the message structure of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols such as X3DH used in Signal. In this work, we present a new deniable split KEM, which we call DiSK (Deniable Split KEM) based on the Module Learning With Error problem.
Conference: International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2025)
Location: Osaka, Japan
Date: November 17-20, 2025
Keywords
Lattice Cryptography, Module Learning With Error, Quantum-Resistant Cryptography, Public-Key Cryptography, Key Encapsulation
Links
References
| APA | B. Goncalves and A. Mashatan, “DiSK – A Deniable Split KEM from Lattices,” in Proc. 24th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2025), Osaka, Japan, Nov. 17–20, 2025, pp. 591-601. |
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| BibTeX | @InProceedings{10.1007, title = "DiSK - A Deniable Split KEM from Lattices", author = {Goncalves, Brian and Mashatan, Atefeh}, year = {2026}, pages = {591-601}, } |
| IEEE | B. Goncalves and A. Mashatan, “DiSK – A Deniable Split KEM from Lattices,” in Proc. 24th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2025), Osaka, Japan, Nov. 17–20, 2025, pp. 591–601. |