Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Psychology evidence is an unreliable source of information about any given claimant. How then can it help decision-makers to make good decisions?
Psychology evidence paints a population-level picture. This kind of evidence can help scientists to make reliable generalizations about population-level effects. But when it comes to making predictions about individuals, even when the individual is a member of the studied population, “reasoning from the group to an individual case presents considerable challenges.”1 Moreover, the field of psychology has long focused on some populations and overlooked others.2 Refugee claimants may well belong to un- or understudied populations. They may also be outliers in the data for many other reasons. As a result, psychology evidence is an unreliable source of information about how any given claimant would think or act.3
A psychological response that is remarkable in the studied populations may be unremarkable for someone like the claimant. If a decision-maker (wrongly) concludes from these studies that a claimant’s testimony is too surprising to be true, they will make one kind of mistake: rejecting true testimony on the basis of unreliable evidence.
At the same time, psychology evidence might show that, among the studied populations, a response is generally unremarkable. If so, this evidence may challenge a decision-maker’s assumption that it is too surprising to be believed. In light of this evidence, why would it be surprising for the claimant – or anyone – to think or act this way? If, in fact, the claimant is an outlier, and this response would be remarkable for someone like them, this reasoning may lead the decision-maker to make a different kind of mistake: accepting false testimony because, on the evidence before them, there is no convincing reason to reject it.
In a refugee status decision, the latter is not only the less harmful mistake – it is precisely what good legal reasoning looks like.4 By making clear when psychological responses are unremarkable – and not when they are remarkable – the Baseline Paper Series facilitates the proper use of psychology evidence in this high-stakes context.5
Why is this called the ‘Baseline’ Paper Series?
The Baseline Paper Series makes clear for decision-makers when certain ways of thinking or acting are unremarkable, unsurprising, unexceptional. It establishes a solid baseline: it identifies psychological responses that are ‘well within the normal range of human experience,’ according to the best available evidence, all else being equal.
Because this evidence only speaks to responses that are well within this normal range, it sets a floor, not a ceiling. Legally and logically, this evidence will not help decision-makers to reach the conclusion that a response is remarkable: outside of this normal range. (Why not provide this information as well?)
What makes a psychological response ‘remarkable’ or ‘unremarkable’?
A psychological response is remarkable if, in the populations that have been studied, it falls outside of the range of normal experience. In such a population, we would not expect to see this response occur simply because of standard variance. When a person does respond this way, we are surprised and we look for an explanation. We expect to find that there is something exceptional about the person or about the circumstances, some difference that helps to explain why their responses are different.
In contrast, a response is unremarkable if, in the populations that have been studied, it falls within the range of normal experience. In such a population, we would expect to see some people respond this way, simply because of the variety of ways that people think and act. Even if only a relatively small proportion of the population would respond this way, we expect that this kind of response will simply happen – to otherwise unexceptional people under otherwise unexceptional circumstances.
What does it mean for a response to be remarkable or unremarkable ‘all else being equal’?
Each scenario in the Baseline Paper Series describes a way of thinking or acting that is unremarkable on its face. Knowing more about the event, the person, or their context could suggest reasons why this outcome would be more (or less) remarkable. ‘All else being equal’ means, however, that no other relevant information is available. On these facts alone, this outcome would be ‘well within the normal range.’
Why do we ask if a response is remarkable or unremarkable? Why not ask, instead, how likely it is?
How likely is it that the claimant is telling the truth? At the end of the day, decision-makers will often ask themselves this question, and in answering it, they may think about whether a psychological response is credible. When they do, knowing whether this response is remarkable or unremarkable is a more helpful starting point than knowing how likely it is.6
On a graph of a population’s favourite animals, even the most popular choices (dog, cat) will be unlikely on a balance of probabilities (‘more likely than not’): as long as it is chosen by less than half of the respondents, ‘dog’ is a less likely than ‘not dog.’ Given the wide range of responses, many other choices (giraffe, koala) will be quite unlikely (shared by only a very small proportion of the population). And yet many of these will be entirely unremarkable. All else being equal, its low statistical probability is hardly a reason to doubt a person’s claim that their favourite animal is the giraffe or the koala.
Other choices, however (mosquito), will be not only unlikely but remarkable. Remarkable claims raise doubts, not just because they are unlikely, but because they violate an expectation: as a rule, people do not like, let alone prefer, noxious insects. All else being equal, with no other information to suggest an explanation, the fact that a claim is remarkable may leave a decision-maker in doubt.
References
1 D L Faigman, J Monahan & C Slobogin, “Group to individual (G2i) inference in scientific expert testimony” (2014) 81 The University of Chicago Law Review 417-480 at 420.
2 M Muthukrishna, A V Bell, J Henrich, C M Curtin, A Gedranovich, J McInerney, & B Thue, “Beyond Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of Cultural and Psychological Distance” (2020) 31 Psychological Science 678–701; T Pollet & TK Saxton, “How Diverse Are the Samples Used in the Journals Evolution & Human Behavior and Evolutionary Psychology?” (2019) 5 Evolutionary Psychological Science 357–368; MS Rad, AJ Martingano & J Ginges, “Toward a Psychology of Homo Sapiens: Making Psychological Science More Representative of the Human Population” (2018) 115 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 11401–11405.
3 H Evans Cameron, “Principled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers” (under review, 2026)
4 H Evans Cameron, Refugee Law’s Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
5 H Evans Cameron, “Principled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers” (under review, 2026)
6 H Evans Cameron, “Principled Asymmetry: Putting Psychology Research Evidence Before Refugee Status Decision-makers” (under review, 2026); H Evans Cameron, “Reasoning with Probability in Truth and Deception Judgments in Refugee Status Decision-making” (in progress)