

Dear Prospective Student,

I joined Toronto Metropolitan University's Department of Philosophy in Fall 2019. For me, coming to TMU was an easy choice: it's an active department with faculty working in an unusually wide range of contemporary and historical areas.

My own research centers on the nature of moral knowledge. I am particularly interested in exploring the view that emotions might be the foundation of our moral knowledge, much as perceptions are the foundation of our empirical knowledge. My work, therefore, bridges issues in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind; it includes moral psychology, perception, and the theory of emotions. I have also done substantial research on the nature and value of hope and plan in-depth investigations of other emotions in the future. For example, I have recently started new projects on despair and romantic love.

I found myself drawn to moral epistemology by some everyday observations. In political discourse, for instance, we are familiar with objections that people are "letting their emotions get the better of them." It can sometimes appear that emotions are chaotic and unreliable. But we are equally familiar with recommendations to listen to one's emotions, or "gut." One way of thinking about my project is that it provides an account of what is true, and what's misleading, about such pretheoretical moral epistemological assumptions, identifying the precise role of the emotions in our ethical lives.

Given my research focus, I would be suited to working with students interested in metaethics, the philosophy of emotions, and/or the philosophy of perception. By 'metaethics', I mean questions about the metaphysics of morality, the possibility of moral knowledge, and the nature of moral language and thought. In the philosophy of emotions, I am excited to work with students interested in general questions about the nature of emotions as well as those interested in specific emotions and their roles (e.g., the role of anger in politics). Finally, in the philosophy of perception, I like to think about the possible contents of perception. For instance, can we literally see pine trees? Or do we only see colors and shapes that lead us to infer that there are pine trees? Why might our answers to such questions matter? Beyond these central areas, I would be happy to work with students in normative ethics, the virtues, certain areas of the history of philosophy (especially the British Moralists), the philosophy of mind, and epistemology.

I look forward to the possibility of talking philosophy with you at TMU!

Sincerely,



Michael Milona
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy